Report of the Iraq Inquiry

Executive Summary

John Chilcot, Lawrence Freedman, Usha Kumari Prashar, Roderic Lyne, Martin Gilbert

The key findings of the public inquiry into Britain's handling of the 2003 Iraq war. Chaired by Sir John Chilcot, the Iraq Inquiry tackled the threat to Britain; the legal advice for the invasion; intelligence about weapons of mass destruction; and planning for a post-conflict Iraq. This 60,000-word executive summary was published in July 2016.
Date Published :
December 2017
Publisher :
Canbury Press
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ISBN : 9781912454044
Pages : 220
Dimensions : 8.5 X 5.3 inches
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Paperback
ISBN : 9780995497801
Pages : 220
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Overview
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The key findings of the public inquiry into the handling of the 2003 Iraq war by the British government led by Tony Blair.

Chaired by Sir John Chilcot, the Iraq Inquiry (known as there 'Chilcot Report') tackled:

• Saddam Hussein's threat to Britain

• the legal advice for the invasion

• intelligence about weapons of mass destruction and

• planning for a post-conflict Iraq.

This 60,000-word executive summary was published in July 2016. 

Philippe Sands QC wrote in the
London Review of Books:

'It offers a long and painful account of an episode that may come to be seen as marking the moment when the UK fell off its global perch, trust in government collapsed and the country turned inward and began to disintegrate.'

Published under an Open Government Licence, this book aims to make better known the findings of the Iraq Inquiry, which took seven years to complete at a cost of £10 million.

The text, headings, footnotes and any emphasis are exactly those of the original document.

Contents

Introduction

Pre-conflict strategy and planning

The UK decision to support US military action

Why Iraq? Why now?

The UK's relationship with the US

Decision-making

Advice on the legal basis for military action

Weapons of mass destruction

Planning for a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq

The post-conflict period

Occupation

Transition

Planning for withdrawal

Did the UK achieve its objectives in Iraq?

Key findings

Lessons

Timeline of events

 

REVIEWS

The Iraq Inquiry, chaired by Sir John Chilcot and composed of five privy councillors, finally published its report on the morning of 6 July, seven years and 21 days after it was established by Gordon Brown with a remit to look at the run-up to the conflict, the conflict itself and the reconstruction, so that we can learn lessons.

It offers a long and painful account of an episode that may come to be seen as marking the moment when the UK fell off its global perch, trust in government collapsed and the country turned inward and began to disintegrate.

— Philippe Sands, London Review of Books 

 

A more productive way to think of the Chilcot report is as a tool to help us set agendas for renewed best efforts in creating more effective and accountable statecraft.

Chilcot has confirmed that... we still do not have intelligent long-range planning by the armed forces in close and active cooperation with other government agencies, nor an adequate and integrated system for the collection and evaluation of intelligence information, nor do we have the highest possible quality and stature of personnel to lead us through these challenging times.

— Derek B. Miller, The Guardian

 

Although sceptics wondered how much more the very-long-awaited Report of the Iraq Inquiry by a committee chaired by Sir John Chilcot could tell us when it appeared at last in July, it proves to contain a wealth of evidence and acute criticism, the more weighty for its sober tone and for having the imprimatur of the official government publisher. In all, it is a further and devastating indictment not only of Tony Blair personally but of a whole apparatus of state and government, Cabinet, Parliament, armed forces, and, far from least, intelligence agencies.

Among its conclusions the report says that there was no imminent threat from Saddam Hussein; that the British chose to join the invasion of Iraq before the peaceful options for disarmament had been exhausted; that military action was not a last resort...

— 
Geoffrey Wheatcroft, The New York Review of Books

Ideal for any student of politics, diplomacy, or conflict.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
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Introduction

Pre-conflict strategy and planning

The UK decision to support US military action. UK policy before 9/11

The impact of 9/11

Decision to take the UN route

Negotiation of resolution 1441

The prospect of military action

The gap between the Permanent Members of the Security Council widens

The end of the UN route

Why Iraq? Why now? Was Iraq a serious or imminent threat?

The predicted increase in the threat to the UK as a result of military action in Iraq

The UK’s relationship with the US

Decision-making. Collective responsibility

Advice on the legal basis for military action. The timing of Lord Goldsmith’s advice on the interpretation of resolution 1441

Goldsmith’s advice of 7 March 2003

Goldsmith’s arrival at a “better view”

The exchange of letters on 14 and 15 March 2003

Goldsmith’s Written Answer of 17 March 2003

Weapons of mass destruction. Iraq WMD assessments, pre-July 2002

Iraq WMD assessments, July to September 2002

Iraq WMD assessments, October 2002 to March 2003

The search for WMD

Planning for a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq. The failure to plan or prepare for known risks

The planning process and decision-making

Occupation. Looting in Basra

Looting in Baghdad

UK influence on post-invasion strategy: resolution 1483

UK influence on the Coalition Provisional Authority

A decline in security

The turning point

Transition. UK influence on US strategy post-CPA

Planning for withdrawal

The impact of Afghanistan

Iraqiisation

Preparation for withdrawal. A major divergence in strategy

A possible civil war

Force Level Review

The beginning of the end

Did the UK achieve its objectives in Iraq?

• Key Findings 1. Development of UK strategy and options, 9/11 to early January 2002

Development of UK strategy and options, January to April 2002 – “axis of evil” to Crawford

Development of UK strategy and options, April to July 2002

Development of UK strategy and options, late July to 14 Sep 2002

• Key Findings 2. Development of UK strategy and options, November 2002 to January 2003

Development of UK strategy and options, 1 February to 7 March 2003

Iraq WMD assessments, pre-July 2002

Iraq WMD assessments, July to September 2002

Iraq WMD assessments, October 2002 to March 2003

WMD search

• Key Findings 3. Advice on the legal basis for military action, November 2002 to March 2003

Development of the military options for an invasion of Iraq

Military planning for the invasion, January to March 2003

Military equipment (pre-conflict)

Planning for a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq

Invasion

• Key Findings 4. The post-conflict period

Reconstruction

De-Ba’athification

Security Sector Reform

Resources

Military equipment (post-conflict)

Civilian personnel

Service Personnel

Civilian casualties

Lessons. The decision to go to war

Weapons of mass destruction

The invasion of Iraq

The post-conflict period

Reconstruction

De-Ba’athification

Security Sector Reform

Resources

Military equipment (post-conflict)

Civilian personnel

Timeline of events

REVIEWS
-

A more productive way to think of the Chilcot report is as a tool to help us set agendas for renewed best efforts in creating more effective and accountable statecraft.

Chilcot has confirmed that... we still do not have intelligent long-range planning by the armed forces in close and active cooperation with other government agencies, nor an adequate and integrated system for the collection and evaluation of intelligence information, nor do we have the highest possible quality and stature of personnel to lead us through these challenging times.

- Derek B. Miller, The Guardian

Although sceptics wondered how much more the very-long-awaited Report of the Iraq Inquiry by a committee chaired by Sir John Chilcot could tell us when it appeared at last in July, it proves to contain a wealth of evidence and acute criticism, the more weighty for its sober tone and for having the imprimatur of the official government publisher. In all, it is a further and devastating indictment not only of Tony Blair personally but of a whole apparatus of state and government, Cabinet, Parliament, armed forces, and, far from least, intelligence agencies.

Among its conclusions the report says that there was no imminent threat from Saddam Hussein; that the British chose to join the invasion of Iraq before the peaceful options for disarmament had been exhausted; that military action was not a last resort...

- Geoffrey Wheatcroft, The New York Review of Books

The Iraq Inquiry, chaired by Sir John Chilcot and composed of five privy councillors, finally published its report on the morning of 6 July, seven years and 21 days after it was established by Gordon Brown with a remit to look at the run-up to the conflict, the conflict itself and the reconstruction, so that we can learn lessons.

It offers a long and painful account of an episode that may come to be seen as marking the moment when the UK fell off its global perch, trust in government collapsed and the country turned inward and began to disintegrate.

- Philippe Sands, London Review of Books

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